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SecureSurgiNET: A framework for
ensuring security in telesurgery
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Asad Waqar Malik1,2 , Mian M Hamayun1,3 and Osman Hasan1
Abstract
The notion of surgical robotics is actively being extended to enable telesurgery, where both the surgeon and patient are
remotely located and connected via a public network, which leads to many security risks. Being a safety-critical applica-
tion, it is highly important to make telesurgery robust and secure against active and passive attacks. In this article, we
propose the first complete framework, called SecureSurgiNET, for ensuring security in telesurgery environments.
SecureSurgiNET is primarily based on a set of well-established protocols to provide a fool-proof telesurgical robotic sys-
tem. For increasing the efficiency of secured telesurgery environments, the idea of a telesurgical authority is introduced
that ensures the integrity, identity management, authentication policy implementation, and postoperative data security.
An analysis is provided describing the security and throughput of Advanced Encryption Standard during the intraopera-
tive phase of SecureSurgiNET. Moreover, we have tabulated the possible attacks on SecureSurgiNET along with the
devised defensive measures. Finally, we also present a time complexity analysis of the SecureSurgiNET through
simulations.
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Introduction
Robotic surgery is an emerging surgical trend that is
leading to the birth of telesurgery.1 In robotics, sur-
geons perform surgeries while sitting in close proximity
to the patient console. On the contrary, telesurgery
enables a surgeon to operate on a patient remotely via
a surgical robot and a communication network between
them. Telesurgical robotic systems (TRSs)1 allow a
master (surgeon console) to operate on a slave (called
surgical robot) situated at a remote geographical loca-
tion. The surgeon visualizes the robotic arms’ response
and movement through video feedback on his console
and controls the robotic arms accordingly.
Operation Lindbergh was the first major break-
through in the telesurgery domain.2 During this opera-
tion, carried out in 2001, Marescaux and his team,
based in the United States, performed robotic surgery
on a patient in France using the ZEUS surgical robot.
The successful accomplishment of this and many pre-
ceding telesurgical procedures paved the success of
remote robotic surgery.1,3 The success of these opera-
tions has provided the evidence that contemporary
TRSs are now capable of tackling mission-critical oper-
ations in extreme environments.1
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Telesurgery provides numerous offerings and bene-
fits, such as quality care to the people of underdeve-
loped countries, access to immediate surgical care for
wounded soldiers, cost-effective solutions across geo-
graphical locations, and active intervention of remote
experts in sophisticated surgeries.4 Moreover, this tech-
nology enables expert surgeons to remotely train young
surgeons all across the globe. Similarly, telesurgery can
bridge the gap and inconsistencies between the health-
care systems of developing and developed countries
and regions. However, all the aforementioned benefits
are reliant on a secure system and its ability to support
security in adversarial, uncontrolled, and hostile envir-
onments.5 Patients’ safety, security, and data privacy
are some of the major obstacles and concerns in these
types of procedures.6 To the best of our knowledge,
one of the main obstacles behind the widespread usage
of telesurgery is the almost nonavailability of secure
dedicated mechanisms for telesurgeries. To our knowl-
edge, the Interoperable Telesurgical Protocol (ITP)5 is
the only available protocol to specifically address the
security requirements of telesurgery. Although this pro-
tocol addresses the issues of authentication and confi-
dentiality, it lacks in addressing the development and
implementation of security policies in national and
international environments.
The accuracy of robotic manipulations and the video
feedback to the surgeon is vital for patients’ safety. This
accuracy is in turn mainly dependent on data integrity,
which is an extremely desirable characteristic of a tele-
surgical system. Integrity helps in achieving the desired
safety and accuracy objectives of safety-critical applica-
tions, such as telesurgery. In case of any intentional or
unintentional data modification, the system must pro-
vide nonrefutable evidence to establish the chain of
accountability.7 Similarly, nonrepudiation is a key fea-
ture that provides evidence against the deniability of
participating entities. Such characteristics would help in
raising patients’ confidence levels and thus would pro-
vide the basis for the success and widespread adoption
of this telesurgical technology.8–10
In this article, we proposed a security framework
(SecureSurgiNET) that provides a foundation for devel-
oping secure telesurgical systems. We adopt a useful
classification, inspired by Dowler and Hall’s11 classifi-
cation, of telesurgery for our security architecture that
breaks the telesurgical procedures into three distinct
phases referred to as the preoperative, intraoperative,
and postoperative phases. In the preoperative phase,
platform integrity is ensured. Furthermore, a secure
connection between the master and slave is established
based on the X.509 digital certificates and patients’ bio-
metric identities. A dummy identity is managed against
a patient’s real identity and is never revealed to any
unauthorized entities. The authentication and authori-
zation processes are controlled by the implementation
of formal policies. Secret parameters are shared only
after a successful authentication session. Similarly,
SecureSurgiNET ensures encryption and authentication
of communication data in both intraoperative and post-
operative phases.
In the intraoperative phase, the proposed framework
provides multiple Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) connec-
tions for communication. The TCP is used for reliable
communication, while UDP provides throughput
advantages. Moreover, Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) is used to encrypt the intraoperative phase com-
munication, that is, video feedback from the patient to
surgeon console and control commands from the sur-
geon to patient consoles. The proposed architecture
enforces confidentiality and integrity of the data in the
intraoperative phase while considering the real-time
requirements. In contrast, during the postoperative
phase, the postsurgical data are collected and stored
securely and anonymously at the central telesurgical
authority (TSA) database server (DBS) for future refer-
ence and legal requirements, if any.
In general, secure identification of doctors and
patients in a telemedicine or telesurgical system is of
prime importance. The key features of secure telemedi-
cine systems include confidentiality of patient informa-
tion, mutual authentication, patient anonymity, data
integrity, freshness of communication, and mobility.12
The proposed SecureSurgiNET handles the identity
challenges through the use of a TSA including a strong
authentication server (SAS) and an identity manage-
ment server (IDMS). The TSA maintains a complete
record of participating entities, including doctors and
patients via the security administrator (SA) IDMS.
Further details are given in section ‘‘SecureSurgiNET:
the proposed framework.’’
The organization of this article is as follows: first,
background and related work are presented. Then pos-
sible attacks and challenges to telesurgical systems are
discussed, followed by details on the proposed architec-
ture of our framework along with the design and flow
of different protocols. In the following section, we dis-
cuss some results of video encryption as well as their
analysis. In the end, we conclude this article and discuss
potential future work.
Background and related work
Telesurgery mainly relies upon surgical robotics and
communication networks, that is, Internet. After years
of research in surgical robotics, ZEUS and da Vinci
surgical robots are now commercially available.3 ZEUS
was also used in the first ever transatlantic surgery,
known as Operation Lindbergh13 in 2001. In this surgi-
cal procedure, Dr Marescaux and his team performed
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laparoscopic cholecystectomy that is, removal of
gallbladder using a minimally invasive procedure, on a
68-year-old woman at a hospital in Strasbourg, France.
The doctor and his team were operating from New
York, USA. The underlying network facilities were
provided by France Telecommunications, which was a
high-bandwidth, reliable, secure, and low-latency asyn-
chronous transfer mode (ATM) network.2 The ZEUS
surgical robotic system was replaced by the da Vinci
system, which is another teleoperated surgical robotic
system and has a comparable efficiency.14
Regardless of the recent research advances in robotic
surgery, very little progress has been made in the area
of security of telesurgery. To date, there does not exist
any complete security framework, specifically for
designing and developing security aspects of telesurgi-
cal systems. There is a dire need for a security frame-
work that takes into account the safety as well as legal
and technical requirements of telesurgeries.15,16 The
most significant work in telesurgery so far is the devel-
opment of ITP, which is designed for interoperability
between the telesurgical robots and controllers.17 But it
ignores the security requirements of telesurgery.
Secure ITP is an enhancement of ITP5 that uses the
open software tools and Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) guidelines to develop a
prototype to address the stringent telesurgery security
requirements. Secure ITP addresses the four security
requirements including authorization, authentication,
communication, and policy development and enforce-
ment. Secure ITP specifies two channels between the
master and slave, that is, the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS). TLS is used to provide security to TCP-based
communication and DTLS is used for UDP communi-
cation. Secure ITP uses AES to encrypt the communi-
cation between the master and slave consoles.5 Secure
ITP is a reasonable design but fails in addressing some
important issues such as patient identity theft, as well
as some other administrative and legal issues.
Dowler and Hall11 have highlighted the safety issues
in telesurgery and divided the telesurgical procedures
into three phases, namely preoperative, intraoperative,
and postoperative phases. In another research,18 the
authors have pointed out security, availability, cost,
and surgeon’s legal responsibility as the major barriers
in the success of remote robotic surgeries. Coble et al.19
proposed a mechanism that allows the verifier to remo-
tely attest the integrity of the software on a telesurgical
robotic system. Tozal et al.1 proposed a new method
that integrates light-weight privacy and adaptive relia-
bility in a single protocol, and it matches the perfor-
mance of the AES cryptosystem. Bonaci et al.20
analyzed the cybersecurity attacks against an advanced
teleoperated robotic surgery system and focused on the
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. They used Fitts’ law to
quantify the impact and to analyze the tasks’ difficulty
under DoS attacks. Dong et al.21 investigated the con-
tent modification attacks on a bilateral teleoperation
system. They also proposed a safety mechanism to safe-
guard against a static malignant content modification
attack. El Kalam et al.22 presented a bilateral general-
ized predictive controller coupled to a quality of service
(QoS)-friendly IP security protocol for telerobotic sys-
tems. P Fekri et al.23 make use of machine learning
algorithms to identify manipulated or incorrect com-
mands, transmitted by any console, during a particular
telesurgery. However, all of these works fail in provid-
ing a comprehensive solution to the problems related
to secure telesurgery.
Besides, several remote health monitoring systems
have been proposed in the literature to secure data of
patients in a public network. R Amin et al.24 proposed
a multi-medical framework to ensure the anonymity
and untraceability of patients during remote monitor-
ing through sensor data. The framework also ensures
confidentiality and integrity of the patient’s data; how-
ever, it does not enforce security policies. V
Sureshkumar et al.25 proposed a robust communication
protocol for ensuring the security of body sensor data
for a smart healthcare system. The proposed system
offers confidentiality, integrity, and anonymity; how-
ever, it lacks enforcement of security policies and is not
fault tolerant. SD Suganthi et al.26 proposed a light-
weight authentication scheme for the IoT-enabled
healthcare environments. The proposed scheme offers
confidentiality and integrity; however, it overlooks
anonymity and does not enforce security policies.
On the contrary, numerous generic security proto-
cols exist which can be tailored to fulfill security
requirements of telesurgery. These standardized generic
protocols have well-tested security features and can be
easily integrated in a variety of applications.27 We have
chosen the best security protocols and adopted the best
design practices and guidelines to design a complete
security framework called SecureSurgiNET. The proto-
cols in the proposed framework provide authentication,
authorization, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity,
and nonrepudiation services. We argue that our pro-
posed framework, that is, SecureSurgiNET, is the first
complete setup that covers all the security requirements
of the preoperative, intraoperative, and postoperative
phases of any telesurgical system.
Attacks and defensive measures
Telesurgery is prone to different types of active and
passive attacks. We have highlighted these attacks and
countermeasures in Table 1.
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SecureSurgiNET: the proposed
framework
SecureSurgiNET is an assimilated framework and its
architecture is shown in Figure 1. Security requirements of
the proposed schemes are as follows: (a) security must be
ensured during the preoperative, intraoperative, and post-
operative phases of remote robotic surgery; (b) the scheme
is designed to provide robust and time-efficient security to
participating entities and assets of the telesurgical systems;
(c) the postoperative phase ensures the secure record-
keeping of the entire intervention with log details. The pro-
posed SecureSurgiNET comprises a patient console (the
telesurgical robot along with a computer system), a TSA
with comprehensive security infrastructure, and a surgeon
console (a combination of surgical robot, its control and
monitoring system). The TSA security infrastructure
includes an SAS, a local certification authority (LCA), an
IDMS and a key distribution server (KDS), an authoriza-
tion and policy server (APS), a telesurgical server (TSS),
and a DBS.
The SecureSurgiNET platform uses well-established
security protocols and practices for authentication,
platform integrity, identity management, authorization,
secure communication, and secure data storage. The
following subsections discuss the proposed
SecureSurgiNET architecture.
TSA
TSA is a centralized authority that acts as a trusted
third-party regulatory body. All framework compo-
nents must be approved and registered with the TSA.
The TSA is responsible for keeping and maintaining
the complete record of participating entities via the SA
IDMS. The telesurgical administrator, after registration
and identity management, defines the authorization
policy and the level of authorization for every entity to
perform various functions as per the requirement, qua-
lification, expertise, and permissions. The following
dedicated servers and components help the TSA to per-
form the abovementioned tasks.
The LCA server. LCA issues, verifies, revokes, and
updates the X.509 standard–based digital certificates
for different entities. LCA establishes a hierarchy with
the higher level certification authority (CA) for further
verification.
SAS. SAS ensures the authentication of participating
entities, such as surgeon console, patient console,
patient, and surgeons, in the preoperative phase of tele-
surgery. The SAS verifies certificates from the LCA
and identities from IDMS for an authentication
Table 1. Attacks and defensive measures for TSRS.
Attack type Instigation scenarios Defensive measures
Eavesdropping The attacker passively sniffs the communication
and releases the sensitive patient information
without permission
Encrypting the communication with secret key
Brute force attack The attacker tries all possible keys in the key
space to recover the secret key
Increasing key size that makes it computationally
infeasible to try all the possible keys. The key
length of more than 128 bits is considered
secure
Masquerading attack The attacker pretends to be the authorized user
and tries to defeat or bypass the authentication
mechanism
X.509 certificate–based strong authentication
can guard against masquerading
Forgery attack The adversary reproduces fraudulently a
command and tries to play it illegitimately
Collision-resistant MAC (Message
Authentication Code) provides proof against
forgeries
Replay attack The adversary illegally replays the legitimate
messages/commands at a later time
Proper use of time-stamps, sequence number,
and session token guards against replay attacks
Session hijacking The attacker tries to gain unauthorized access to
the surgeon/patient console by stealing or
guessing the session parameters
Using the PKI to securely negotiate session
parameters and use of random numbers can
shun away guessing or stealing of session
parameters
Viruses/worms Viruses, worms and APTs can cause operating
system malfunctions and crashes
Platform integrity verification helps early
detection of such attacks
Data theft Static and dynamic data With proper authentication and encryption of
data, theft could be avoided
Data deletion Adversary can delete static and dynamic data Strong authentication, authorization, and auditing
help in limiting the illegal data accesses and thus
provide protection against data deletion
TSRS: telesurgical robotic system; PKI: public key infrastructure; APT: advanced persistent threat.
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process. The authentication protocol proposed for our
architecture is an extension of the strong authentication
protocol described in FIPS-196.28
IDMS and KDS. IDMS is responsible for the storage and
management of identities. It registers, updates, and dis-
tributes the identities for the participating entities.
Furthermore, IDMS is responsible for issuing anon-
ymous identities (AIDs) to patients against their bio-
metric identity. These AIDs are used for protecting the
patient’s privacy. The KDS is liable to generate, man-
age, and securely distribute all the session security keys
to entities.
APS. The policy server is responsible for managing the
access and authorization policies. It is responsible for
granting authorization to surgeons in order to conduct
remote surgeries through the TSS. The TSS enforces
the policies via a policy enforcement point (PEP) in
coordination with its policy decision point (PDP). On
successful validation of the user request, the authoriza-
tion server securely issues the tokens authorizing access
to the requested resources.
DBS. DBS is responsible for the secure storage of
patients’ medical data during the postoperative phase.
An anonymous patient identity (APID) is used for data
storage to protect the privacy of patients in case of any
breach. Furthermore, it is ensured that access to data
can only be permitted to authorized entities. The stored
data are properly encrypted to ensure confidentiality
and privacy of patients.
Patient console. Patient console, also known as the slave
console, is appropriately equipped with the telesurgical
robot, associated control, hardware/software, and the
feedback devices. The feedback devices are used for
providing the visual and audio feedback to the remote
surgeon. This feedback is very important to judge the
exact position and status of the patient and the surgical
robot. All the feedback and controlling devices are reg-
istered, evaluated, and recommended by the TSA, prior
to the commencement of telesurgery. Each console is
embedded with a trusted platform module (TPM) chip
for remote verification.
Surgeon console. Surgeon or the master console is
equipped with the controlling and interacting devices
to aid the surgeon to remotely control the surgical
robot. The surgeon can remotely manipulate telesurgi-
cal robot on the patient console through the hardware
devices and can perceive the reaction through video dis-
play. All the hardware control commands are transpar-
ently translated into communicable format and are
managed by the underlying robust and secure software.
The surgeon console has the TPM chip for platform
integrity verification and secret key storage.
TSS. TSS interacts with different servers having TSA
on behalf of authenticated users. It verifies the authen-
ticity of users and forwards their requests to the inter-
nal resources of the TSA. It acts as a bridge between
the internal and external entities. It coordinates with
the TSA and sends the responses back to the users.
Design and flow of protocols
The registration phase
The TSA SA, with its administrative privileges, registers
the master and slave consoles and maintains the identi-
ties in the IDMS database. The profiles of surgeons
with information such as qualification, expertise, and
Figure 1. SecureSurgiNET framework architecture.
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capabilities are maintained in the IDMS. Policies are
formulated and enforced by the SA, which also requests
the LCA for the issuance of digital certificates to differ-
ent entities. After the digital certificate issuance, the SA
securely manages the public keys and identities in the
IDMS database. All of these tasks are performed prior
to the commencement of the intraoperative phase.
The flow and sequence of different protocols are
shown in Figure 2. In the preoperative phase, our
framework ensures platform integrity and participants’
authentication, and subsequently grants authorization.
In the end, the session keys are securely distributed to
valid users in the preoperative phase. An AID is also
issued to the patient against biometric identity in the
preoperative phase. We propose to use the FIPS-196-
based authentication with extended features in our
framework. Digital certificates are verified by the LCA
and identities are verified by the IDMS.27
After the successful authentication, the policy server
validates and delegates authorization to perform the tel-
esurgical procedure. During the intraoperative phase, a
secure and reliable real-time protocol ensures the confi-
dentiality and integrity of the data. TCP and UDP con-
nections are established for reliability and throughput,
respectively. AES encryption is used for confidentiality
and privacy purposes. Finally, during the postoperative
Figure 2. Protocol flow and message details of SecureSurgiNET.
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phase, the complete data of the session are securely
stored within the DBS against the patient’s AID. This
information may be used in future for postoperative
follow-up.
The preoperative phase
In the preoperative phase, the platform integrity,
authentication, and authorization are ensured. Patient’s
AID against biometric identity is also issued and main-
tained during this phase. Furthermore, session para-
meters are also negotiated in the preoperative phase.
These tasks are briefly described below.
Platform integrity verification. In response to the TSA chal-
lenge, both patient and surgeon consoles calculate the
platform configuration register (PCR) values and digi-
tally sign them with the secret key embedded in the
TPM chip. The PCR values are sent to the TSA for
verification against the PCR values that are already
stored in the TSA. If the PCR values match against the
already stored values, the system is considered healthy.
Authentication process. Authentication starts with a mes-
sage exchange between the slave console and the SAS.
The details and format of the challenge and response
messages are described in Figure 2. The TSA authenti-
cates the patient and surgeon console on the basis of
X.509 digital certificates. These certificates are verified
and validated by the LCA from the issuing authority.
After authentication, the TSA issues a token to get
authorization.
Patient AID. After the completion of platform integrity
and authentication, the next step is to generate and
maintain an AID against patient’s biometric identity.
The TSA, after receiving the patient’s biometric iden-
tity, securely issues an AID against the biometric iden-
tity. The AID adds an extra layer of protection against
identity theft and enhances privacy.
Authorization process. The patient console sends an
authorization request along with authentication tokens
to the TSS. The TSS, after verifying the token, forwards
it to the IDMS and KDS. The IDMS checks the policy
against APID and sends back the response back to the
TSS. After receiving the response from the IDMS, the
TSS forwards the request for authorization and session
key to the authorization and key distribution server.
The APS, after coordinating with the policy server, per-
mits or denies the request.
Key distribution process. If permitted, the APS requests
the KDS for the session keys. The KDS generates the
key for the current session and updates the IDMS data-
base accordingly and sends the encrypted keys back to
the TSS. Session keys are encrypted with the public
keys of the patient and surgeon consoles. It also conca-
tenates the session ID, random numbers, surgery type,
and participants’ identities with the authorization
token. The KDS sends this message to authorization
severs, which then in turn forward it to the TSS. The
TSS passes on this message to the requesting parties,
that is, patient and surgeon consoles. Patient and sur-
geon consoles extract the session keys and other para-
meters and store them securely. Now, after having the
session key, they are capable of generating other keys
and able to establish a secure connection based on sym-
metric key cryptography. This secure session ensures
confidentiality and integrity of data during the intrao-
perative phase.
The intraoperative phase
After the completion of the preoperative phase, the
intraoperative phase starts, which is very crucial for
patients’ safety and privacy. In this phase, patients’
video data and robotic commands travel over the
Internet and thus could be compromised if not properly
protected. Thus, our proposed framework specifies a
standard track protocol AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
(SRTP). With SRTP being a profile of a standard pro-
tocol, Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) is suitable
for real-time audio, video, and control commands and
data communication between patient and surgeon con-
soles. SRTP provides confidentiality, integrity, and
protection against the replay attacks.
SRTP with AES-GCM can encounter computational
overhead by adopting a light-weight noncryptographic
hash function, called GHASH. The GHASH is a keyed
hash, especially adopted for the Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) standard and adds a little overhead. Similarly,
the AES provides data confidentiality in our frame-
work. It is a standard block cipher and, as per the
National Security Agency (NSA)-defined policy, it is
suitable for the protection of classified and SECRET
information with the key widths of 128 bits or more.29
Moreover, it is further recommended with the key sizes
of 192 and 256 bits for top SECRET communication.
In the literature,5,7 different protocols have been ana-
lyzed and AES is considered more suitable for life-
critical applications.
GCM is adopted by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) as a standard for
authenticated encryption and has been published in
Special Publication SP-800-38D November, 2007.30
The NIST standard provides specific implementation
details for authenticated encryption. It is highlighted
that GCM is efficient and accelerates the process of
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authenticated encryption by providing parallel imple-
mentation in hardware as well as in software. The Intel
architecture provides a specific instruction, that is,
PCLMULQDQ (Carry-Less Multiplication
Quadword), to accelerate performance.31
The postoperative phase
The postoperative phase commences once the surgical
procedure is successfully completed. In this phase, both
the master and slave consoles reconcile and create data
backup in the DBS. The backup is stored in an
encrypted form against the APID. The TSA time-
stamps and digitally signs the data before storing at the
DBS. However, the data can be made available for dif-
ferent research and analysis purposes, with the permis-
sion of the patient. Furthermore, the stored data can
be used for audit, in case of postsurgical complications,
and to ascertain that all the responsibilities have been
fulfilled. Moreover, the data can be shared with differ-
ent users, such as patients, doctors, and surgeons. But,
before handing over these data, these are properly for-
matted so that the privacy of the patients can be pre-
served. For this purpose, a trusted framework for
health information exchange32 is needed that makes the
patient data fully unidentifiable using the l-diversity
algorithm before sharing.
Results and discussion
The intraoperative phase is very crucial in terms of
timely availability of patients’ video data to the surgeon
and transfer of control commands from the surgeon to
patient console. As data encryption is a computation-
ally intensive process, we simulate the AES for different
sizes of videos to judge the performance throughput.
For simulation purposes, a system having a 2.40 GHz
CPU, 8 GB RAM, and a Core i5 processor running
Windows 8 (32 bits) and NetBeans IDE 7.4 is used.
The Java cryptography classes are used to perform
encryption and decryption of videos.
Results
The encryption and decryption throughputs for video
files of different sizes against 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key
sizes are depicted in Figure 3. The overall time delay of
the SecureSurgiNET framework for different qualities
of video and AES key lengths is presented in Table 2. It
provides figures for the overall AES encryption time,
network delay, and AES decryption time. An increase
in time delay with comparatively larger key lengths can
be observed from Figure 4.
Discussion
AES performance. It is evident from Figure 3 that, by
increasing the key size, the throughput decreases but
the level of security rises exponentially. The presented
data signify that AES is quite efficient in terms of per-
formance and higher key sizes with very minor trade-
Table 2. SecureSurgiNEToverall time delay (in ms).
Video quality (pixels)
AES key length (bits) 360 720 1080
128 24 48 74
192 35 77 126
256 49 104 166
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard.
Figure 3. Comparative throughput of AES encryption and
decryption for different key lengths.
Figure 4. AES-based time delay of the SecureSurgiNET
framework for different qualities of video and key lengths.
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offs in the throughput. The size of the TCP and UDP
packets is in bytes and AES encryption adds overhead
of only a few milliseconds. A very high quality video,
which requires 0.15 MB/s, can easily be encrypted and
decrypted without any noticeable visual impact and
additional delays. This minor overhead, on the con-
trary, provides a high level of security and privacy to
the patient’s medical records.
Furthermore, it can be examined from Figure 4 that,
by increasing the key size, the time delay increases as
well. The same can be examined with increasing the
video quality. From the data presented in Table 2 and
Figure 4, we can observe that the 128-bit encrypted
transmission is approximately 50% faster than the 256-
bit encryption and approximately 30% faster compared
with the 192-bit encryption. It can also be observed
that the performance of encryption increases with the
increase in video quality.
The time complexity and throughput analysis pre-
sented above clarifies that the proposed algorithm pro-
vides good performance even with a low-end computing
machine. Using a state-of-the-art computing machine,
one can perform these computations very fast and with
very minimal overhead. Furthermore, the preoperative
and postoperative phases are flexible and the time over-
head will not affect the procedure significantly.
AES security. We propose to use the AES encryption to
encrypt the video and command data during the intrao-
perative phase. The AES is the state-of-the-art encryp-
tion algorithm with three key bit lengths, that is, 128,
192, and 256 bits. The security of AES is very high
compared to DES (Data Encryption Standard), 3DES,
Blowfish, RC4, and IDEA (International Data
Encryption Algorithm). European Union (EU) consor-
tium recommends AES with 128 bits as the minimum
for security purposes, but it is expected that 192 or
256 bits would be a more feasible choice in the next
15–20 years. There is no known successful attack
against AES but DES is susceptible to linear33 and
differential cryptanalysis.29 Blowfish has a 64-bit block
size and is not suitable for most applications. Also,
there are many reported attacks34–36 against reduced-
round Blowfish. Security of the ciphers is quantified
with the key length and 128-bit AES is suitable for
SECRET applications, while 192- and 256-bit AES for
TOP SECRET purposes. There are a number of
attacks reported against RC4 such as the state recovery
attack,37 secret key recovery attack,38 and various other
attacks.39 Thus, it is concluded that AES security is
suitable for telesurgical purposes due to its strong alge-
braic properties and the fact that there are no reported
successful attacks against it. These findings are sup-
ported from the reported analysis of different encryp-
tion algorithms such as RC4, DES, 3DES, and IDEA
and it was concluded that AES is a secure, fast, and
reliable algorithm in terms of security and perfor-
mance.40 Furthermore, its key lengths make brute force
attack impractical with the current state-of-the-art
computing machines. For hash functions, we have pro-
posed the use of GCM, which is provably secure,41 is
very efficient as well as fast due to its hardware imple-
mentation, and is fully parallelizable.42
Analysis
Comparison of our proposed framework with existing
approaches is presented in Table 3. We can analyze that
the SecureSurgiNET is more comprehensive and com-
plete than the existing approaches in this realm. A brief
description of some features is given in the following.
Security strength
The implementation of the proposed framework is
based on well-established and standardized protocols
to provide a robust and secure system for telesurgery.
Furthermore, using digital certificates and crypto-
graphic nonce ensures strong authentication and
guards against masquerading and replay attacks.
Table 3. Comparison of SecureSurgiNETwith existing approaches.
Authors Security
policies
Confidentiality Integrity Adaptability Anonymity Telesurgery Fault
tolerance
Nonrepudiation
V Sureshkumar
et al.25
3   3  3 3 3
SD Suganthi
et al.26
3   3 3 3 3 3
R Amin et al.24 3     3  3
P Fekri et al.23 3 3 3 3 3  3 3
GS Lee et al.5  3  3 3  3 
HH King et al.17 3 3 3 3 3  3 3
SecureSurgiNET
(the proposed
system)
       
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Implementation of appropriate policies, authorization
rules, and identity management reinforces our system
against session hijacking. A strong cipher like AES has
the potential to thwart spying and criminal privacy vio-
lations. Moreover, the dedicated servers are used for
each task and, if any server is compromised, its effects
will be limited only to that single resource and the
attacker cannot threaten the security of other servers.
A centralized TSA makes it possible to enforce strong
security policies and access rules in an international
environment. Thus, standardized surgical practices can
be enforced effectively in the proposed architecture.
Moreover, SRTP with AES-GCM ensures the imple-
mentation of security services in real time for the
underlying system. Additional chaining of patient data
with AID adds an extra layer of privacy.
Scalability
The design concept of the central TSA and public key
infrastructure (PKI) makes the proposed framework
more scalable. Moreover, it can be extended to multi-
ple geographic locations with tighter policies to con-
nect patients with their desired surgeons around the
globe.
Adaptability
The modular design of SecureSurgiNET provides easy
integration with new protocols without any significant
change. If technological advances introduce more effi-
cient and robust security protocols, our system can
adapt and integrate with them quickly and without any
significant update requirements.
Fault tolerance
The modular design of SecureSurgiNET enables decen-
tralized access to different components of the system,
that is, if a server/component fails (due to any reason),
then it does not stop other components from working.
With load balancing between different parallel servers
offering the same functionality, the system continues to
work in the event of failure.
Nonrepudiation
With the security policies enforcement along with the
comprehensive authentication and authorization
mechanisms, the system guarantees the authenticity and
effectiveness of operations between different entities.
Computation and communication overhead
Although SecureSurgiNET has some overhead in
terms of communication and computation, it is com-
parable to the alternatives such as TLS and DTLS.
Adaptation of AES-GCM makes fast authentication
encryption possible and thus outshines other security
algorithms. Its efficient hardware and software imple-
mentation and parallelization capability makes it
more proficient. The proposed SecureSurgiNET adds
more value in terms of security and safety to the tele-
surgical systems. However, the adaptation of AES
with the parallelized version of GCM can make it fur-
ther valuable.
Conclusion
The proposed SecureSurgiNET framework is designed
to meet the stringent safety and security requirements
of telesurgical systems in all phases. The contribution
of this article is multifold. To our knowledge, it is the
first complete framework for the security of telesurgical
systems. In the preoperative phase, the TSA forms a
special purpose PKI that provides numerous benefits
such as platform integrity and participant authentica-
tion and authorization. Patients’ AID adds an extra
layer of privacy and guards against identity theft.
During the intraoperative phase, our framework pro-
vides an efficient and secure encryption and authentica-
tion scheme. This scheme is based on standardized and
well-established security protocols, which offer a high
level of security and throughput.
The security, along with its modularity, makes our
design flexible and adaptable. It can integrate newly avail-
able protocols quite easily and with greater flexibility,
without affecting much of the underlying architecture. All
policies and credentials are securely and centrally man-
aged, thus providing the capability to enforce ever-
changing policies and rules. Access to the data can only
be granted after proper authentication and authorization
that guards against illegal data deletions and modifica-
tions. This framework provides a foundation for develop-
ing secure and robust telesurgical systems.
In future, this framework will be formally evaluated
in terms of adequacy in providing security to telesur-
gery. For this purpose, a complete prototype or simula-
tion setup needs to be developed.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
10 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iDs
Asad W Malik https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3804-997X
Mian M Hamayun https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4800-2211
References
1. Tozal ME, Wang Y, Al-Shaer E, et al. On secure
and resilient telesurgery communications over
unreliable networks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE confer-
ence on computer communications workshops (INFO-
COM WKSHPS), Shanghai, China, 10–15 April 2011,
pp.714–719. New York: IEEE.
2. Marescaux J, Leroy J, Gagner M, et al. Transatlantic
robot-assisted telesurgery. Nature 2001; 413(6854):
379–380.
3. Elprama SA, Kilpi K, Duysburgh P, et al. Identifying
barriers in telesurgery by studying current team practices
in robot-assisted surgery. In: Proceedings of the 7th inter-
national conference on pervasive computing technologies
for healthcare (PervasiveHealth), Venice, 5–8 May 2013,
pp.224–231.
4. Boonyarattaphan A, Bai Y and Chung S. A security
framework for e-health service authentication and e-
health data transmission. In: Proceedings of the 9th inter-
national symposium on communications and information
technology, Icheon, South Korea, 28–30 September 2009,
pp.1213–1218. New York: IEEE.
5. Lee GS and Thuraisingham B. Cyberphysical systems
security applied to telesurgical robotics. Comput Stand
Interf 2012; 34(1): 225–229.
6. Sharkey N and Sharkey A. Robotic surgery: on the cut-
ting edge of ethics. Computer 2013; 46(1): 56–64.
7. Stanberry B. Legal ethical and risk issues in telemedicine.
Comput Method Progr Biomed 2001; 64(3): 225–233.
8. Prabakar M, Diaz A, Guevara DC, et al. A study of tele-
robotic surgery and telementoring in space missions. In:
Proceedings of the 29th southern biomedical engineering
conference (SBEC), Miami, FL, 3–5 May 2013, pp.155–
156. New York: IEEE.
9. Smithwick M. Network options for wide-area telesur-
gery. J Telemed Telecare 1995; 1(3): 131–138.
10. Holt D, Zaidi A, Abramson J, et al. Telesurgery:
advances and trends. Univ Toronto Med J 2004; 82(1):
52–54.
11. Dowler N and Hall CJ. Safety issues in telesurgery: sum-
mary. In: Proceedings of the IEE colloquium on towards
telesurgery, London, 20 June 1995, pp.6/1–6/3. New
York: IEEE.
12. Rezaeibagha F and Mu Y. Practical and secure telemedi-
cine systems for user mobility. J Biomed Inform 2018;
78(2): 24–32.
13. Herrmann KL. Cybersurgery: the cutting edge. Rutgers
Comput Technol Law J 2005; 32(1): 297.
14. Hubens G, Coveliers H, Balliu L, et al. A performance
study comparing manual and robotically assisted
laparoscopic surgery using the da Vinci system. Surg
Endoscopy Interven Technique 2003; 17(10): 1595–1599.
15. Doarn CR and Moses GR. Overcoming barriers to wider
adoption of mobile telerobotic surgery: engineering, clinical
and business challenges. In: Doarn CR and Moses GR.
(eds) Surgical robotics: systems applications and visions.
New York: Springer, 2011, pp.69–102.
16. Dickens BM and Cook RJ. Legal and ethical issues in
telemedicine and robotics. Int J Gynecol Obstetric 2006;
94(1): 73–78.
17. King HH, Tadano K, Donlin R, et al. Preliminary proto-
col for interoperable telesurgery. In: Proceedings of the
international conference on advanced robotics, Munich,
22–26 June 2009, pp.1–6. New York: IEEE.
18. Challacombe B, Kavoussi L, Patriciu A, et al. Technol-
ogy insight: telementoring and telesurgery in urology. Nat
Clin Pract Urol 2006; 3(11): 611–617.
19. Coble K, Wang W, Chu B, et al. Secure software attesta-
tion for military telesurgical robot systems. In: Proceed-
ings of the military communications conference, San Jose,
CA, 31 October–3 November 2010, pp.965–970. New
York: IEEE.
20. Bonaci T, Yan J, Herron J, et al. Experimental analysis
of denial-of-service attacks on teleoperated robotic sys-
tems. In: Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE sixth interna-
tional conference on cyber-physical systems, Seattle, WA,
14–16 April 2015, pp.11–20. New York: ACM.
21. Dong Y, Gupta N and Chopra N. On content modifica-
tion attacks in bilateral teleoperation systems. In: Pro-
ceedings of the American control conference (ACC),
Boston, MA, 6–8 July 2016, pp.316–321. New York:
IEEE.
22. El Kalam AA, Ferreira A and Kratz F. Bilateral teleo-
peration system using QoS and secure communication
networks for telemedicine applications. IEEE Syst J
2016; 10(2): 709–720.
23. Fekri P, Setoodeh P, Khosravian F, et al. Towards deep
secure tele-surgery. In: Proceedings of the international
conference on scientific computing (CSC), 2018, pp.81–86,
https://csce.ucmss.com/cr/books/2018/LFS/CSREA2018/
CSC4135.pdf
24. Amin R, Islam SH, Gope P, et al. Anonymity preserving
and lightweight multimedical server authentication pro-
tocol for telecare medical information system. IEEE J
Biomed Health Inf 2019; 23(4): 1749–1759.
25. Sureshkumar V, Amin R, Vijaykumar VR, et al. Robust
secure communication protocol for smart healthcare sys-
tem with FPGA implementation. Future Gener Comput
Syst 2019; 100: 938–951.
26. Suganthi SD, Anitha R, Sureshkumar V, et al. End to
end light weight mutual authentication scheme in IoT-
based healthcare environment. J Reliab Intell Environ
2019; 2019: 1–11.
27. Abbasi AG and Muftic S. CryptoNET: security manage-
ment protocols. In: Proceedings of the 9th World Scien-
tific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS)
international conference on data networks, communica-
tions, computers, Faro, 3–5 November 2010, pp.15–20,
http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2010/Faro/DN
COCO/DNCOCO-01.pdf
Iqbal et al. 11
28. Camarillo DB, Krummel TM and Salisbury JK. Robotic
technology in surgery: past, present, and future. Am J
Surg 2004; 188(4): 2–15.
29. Matsui M. Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher.
In: Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and applica-
tion of cryptographic techniques, Lofthus, 23–27 May
1993, pp.386–397. Berlin: Springer.
30. Dworkin MJ. Recommendation for block cipher modes of
operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.
Special Publication 800–38D, 28 November 2007.
Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
31. Jankowski K and Laurent P. Packed AES-GCM algo-
rithm suitable for AES/PCLMULQDQ instructions.
IEEE Trans Comput 2011; 60(1): 135–138.
32. Afzal M, Hussain M, Ahmad M, et al. Trusted frame-
work for health information exchange. In: Proceedings of
the frontiers of information technology (FIT), Islamabad,
Pakistan, 19–21 December 2011, pp.308–313. New York:
IEEE.
33. Biham E and Shamir A. Differential cryptanalysis of
DES-like cryptosystems. J Cryptol 1991; 4(1): 3–72.
34. Kara O and Manap C. A new class of weak keys for
Blowfish. In: Proceedings of the international workshop on
fast software encryption, Luxembourg, 26–28 March
2007, pp.167–180. New York: Springer.
35. Rijmen V. Cryptanalysis and design of iterated block
ciphers. PhD Thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Leuven, 1997.
36. Vaudenay S. On the weak keys of Blowfish. In: Proceed-
ings of the international workshop on fast software encryp-
tion, vol. 1039, Cambridge, 21–23 February 1996,
pp.27–32. New York: IEEE.
37. Maximov A and Khovratovich D. New state recovery
attack on RC4. In: Proceedings of the annual international
cryptology conference, Santa Barbara, CA, 16–20 August
2008, pp.297–316. New York: Springer.
38. Biham E and Carmeli Y. Efficient reconstruction of RC4
keys from internal states. In: Proceedings of the interna-
tional workshop on fast software encryption, Lausanne,
10–13 February 2008, pp.270–288. New York: Springer.
39. Maitra S and Paul G. New form of permutation bias and
secret key leakage in keystream bytes of RC4. In: Pro-
ceedings of the international workshop on fast software
encryption, Lausanne, 10–13 February 2008, pp.253–269.
New York: Springer.
40. Mushtaque MA. Comparative analysis on different para-
meters of encryption algorithms for information security.
Int J Comput Sci Eng 2014; 2(4): 76–82.
41. Iwata T, Ohashi K and Minematsu K. Breaking and
repairing GCM security proofs. In: Proceedings of the
advances in cryptology, Santa Barbara, CA, 18–22 August
2012, pp.31–49. New York: Springer.
42. Urmonov O and Kim H. An energy-efficient fail recovery
routing in TDMA MAC protocol-based wireless sensor
network. Electronics 2018; 7(12): 444–454.
12 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
